### Russia's Arctic security strategy: post Ukraine reassessment

#### Ekaterina Klimenko

#### Stockholm International Peace Research Institute klimenko@sipri.org



# Arctic 'spirit of cooperation'

"preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation is of the utmost importance. It is our conviction that the Arctic area should serve as a platform for uniting forces for genuine partnership in the economy, security, science, education and the preservation of the North's cultural heritage. The speculations regarding the conflict in the Arctic lack real grounds" – Vladimir Putin (2010)







# Increasing security rhetoric

- In February 2013, President Putin noted that militarization of the Arctic was among the remaining dangers faced by Russia
- In April 2014: "the changing international context and socioeconomic situation was fraught with new risks and challenges to Russia's national interests, including in the Arctic" – Vladimir Putin
- A broad spectrum of potential challenges and threats to our national security is now being formed in the Arctic. Therefore, one of the defense ministry's priorities is to develop military infrastructure in this zone" – Sergei Shoigu, Defence Minister of the Russian Federation (2015)

Military Doctrine 2014

Dmitry Rogozin is appointed the Head of the Arctic Commission

Maritime Doctrine 2015

# Maritime Doctrine (2015)

- Limitless access to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans
- Key importance of the capabilities of the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet for the defence of Russia
- 'lowering the threats in the Arctic region' is the main policy goal in the Arctic, which will be achieved through, among other things, trhough strengthening of the Northern Fleet



# Russia's Arctic Strategy (2013) Armed forces

- The provision of favourable operating conditions in Russia's Arctic Zone by, among other things, maintaining the necessary level of combat readiness of armed forces troops in accordance with existing and predictable military dangers and threats
- (*a*) prevent non-military pressure and aggression against Russia and its allies, (*b*) ensure the sovereign rights of Russia's Arctic Zone and opportunities for the smooth implementation of all of its activities, (*c*) provide strategic deterrence, and (*d*) in the event of armed conflict, repel aggression and cessation of hostilities on terms that meet the interests of Russia.



# Russia's Arctic Strategy (2013) Coast Guard and Border Guard

- (a) improvements to, and development of, the border control system and border infrastructure of Russia's Arctic Zone;
- (b) the creation of an integrated control system for marine surface surveillance;
- (c) the formation of an actively functioning coastguard system under the Russian FSB in the Arctic Zone;
- (d) the reinvigoration of the system of emergency preparedness, including establishment of emergency centres;
- (e) the implementation of an integrated security system for the protection of areas, population and critical facilities of Russia's Arctic Zone from the threats of natural and manmade disasters.



# Military developments in the Russian Arctic

Modernization of the Northern Fleet (new SSBNs)

Restoration of the a number of airfields and radar stations

- Arctic brigades: the 80th Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade (3600 troops) was established in Alakurtti (located 60 km from the Finnish border).
- Changed command structure: Joint Military Command "North" (2014)

Military exercises

FSB Border Guard and Coast Guard

Search and rescue centers under the ministry of emergencies





### Russia's military build-up in the region





# Rhetoric vs reality

Little change in Russia's Arctic Security policy, if any at all, since "Russia's return" to the Arctic region

- The current increase of military and paramilitary capacity was announced in the Arctic Strategies as of 2008 and 2013
- Plans within the Russia's rearmaments and modernization programmes date back to 2008
- Many of the current plans risks not being implemented due to current financial situation
- Shift in priorities: investment will be directed to the Black Sea Fleet





# Changed perception of Russia's military capabilities in the Arctic

- 'a return to a more normal level of activity for a major power with legitimate interests in the region' - Gahr Støre, J., Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Statement at NATO seminar 'Current Strategic Challenges in the High North' (2009)
- 'Russia's conduct represents the gravest challenge to European security. As a consequence, the security situation in the Nordic countries' adjacent areas has become significantly worsened during the past year' - statement by Nordic defence ministers, Aftonposten (2015)



### Some conclusions

Russia's growing deployment of military forces in the region

a response to new security challenges in the Arctic modernizing the forces of nuclear deterrence and protection for them

- It is the result of the long-term policy of modernization and restructuring of the Russian armed forces and still very limited
- Russia increased military capabilities **IN** the Arctic and not so much **FOR** the Arctic

There is no militarization in the Arctic



#### SIPRI's work on the Arctic

sipri

SIPRI

34

sipri SIPRI Background Paper March 2012

#### MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE ARCTIC

DIMONT, WEDERAN

#### I. Introduction

in recurs pages the forecase of he reaching climate change in the Arctic has led to form of future conflict in the regim, Such form have been expressed in official documents, including defence policy documents, of the live Arcele Itroval states - Canada, Denmark, Norseny, Rumia and the United States. Three of them - Canada, Denmark and Russia-have recently adopted hesign and defence policies that have put a special anotheris on the Arcele They have screeghened their military presence in the Arctle or increased military capabilities for Arctic use and have presented ptoto for additional military aronghoning. Meanwhile, Norway has moved a substantial part of its operational forces to the words of the essentry. Of the five littural states, only the USA has placed less hous on Arctic security.

This paper provides an overview of the military capabilities of Canada. Durinark, Norway, Bassia and the USA for operations in the Arctic and the orgoing or planted improvements in these capabilities, especially in the Areste arean beyond their national surritories.

#### 11. Canada

The government of Stephen Harper, Canadian prime minister since 2006, has stade prosecting and scrunghening threada's 'deetic soundares' a priority. Canada's partent delence policy is considered in the Canada Pirse. lefency serange of 2008, which includes place for inseconcetes well 2028.<sup>5</sup> In puts a tenewed originasis on defending Canada's someralgree, including in the Arctic region or it becomes more accossible. Canada's Arctic policy is specified in the government's Northern for stegy, which was released in July 2008.1 This increased emphasis in policy has been matched by procurement. of new conference, expansion of special Arctic forces and increased training in the Arctic and community.

#### Air capabilities

The Royal Canadian Air Porce operator 24 CP-140 (P-2C) and submarine warfare (ASW) alterade that have the range to partic the Aretic region from

<sup>1</sup> Canadran Department of National Debanes (2005), Canada Frier Delays. Binarga (2005) Ethionis, R. (eds. 5506).
<sup>17</sup> Complian Conversional, Country's Nucleurs: Branges: Dar North, Unr Herburgs, Dar Patron (Displays of Divide Works and Discontained Internet Process, NIC 2000).

SUMMARY · Climate charge is making the Arcticegias and its experted natural resources - more accessible. Overflatering chines. to the first Arcele Brown stars - Canada Dammark. Norwest Reads and the Debod Scane handhalts harned future conflict in the region In recent years all first sentrice here included Increased protection of Arctic territories and chilose to their defence politics. All five horse alless at period to increase their military preserves and angubilities in the Arotic region he washing Arctic specific agaipment, improving military infrastructure or increasing sulliary loves. While these sharpes are

autoritizes portrajed as significant solition's build-app and presented therears to any service, the first states are making only limited in reason in their cipabilities is project military power beyond their rangetted national permitteries those every the becomposite auffigury forces does give a une reasons for concern, which military confidence building measuremight help to whites.



LINDA JAKOBSON AND JINGCHAO PENG







